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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

ROGELIO LIMONTA LEYVA,1

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 940758-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) , whereby a defendant in a district
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a
first degree or capital felony.

See also Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a) .

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or
in Addendum A:
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Const, amend. IV
Const. amend. V
Const, amend. VI
Const, art. I, § 12
R. Evid. 402
R. Evid. 403
Code Ann. § 41-la-1302
Code Ann. § 41-la-1305
Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5
Code Ann. § 41-6-13
Code Ann. § 76-8-305

1. Rogelio Leyva Limonta is an incorrect reference.
correct name is Rogelio Limonta Leyva. (R 206).

The

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in not holding that under the

totality of the circumstances, Mr. Leyva's statements were obtained
illegally and should have been excluded from the jury?
a.

When an officer fails to give Miranda warnings and

improperly elicits incriminating statements from a defendant who has
been arrested, handcuffed, and searched, does the initial police
illegality taint subsequently elicited "Miranda-ized" statements
which are similar to those already "out of the bag"?
b.

When a defendant is asked if he understands the

Miranda warnings and he says, "I don't know", must statements
elicited thereafter be suppressed if the officer failed to both
properly clarify such a response and obtain a valid waiver?
Our review of the Miranda issue is non-deferential
because this court stands in the same position as the
trial court in reviewing the transcript of an
interrogation. When a trial court bases its "ultimate
conclusions concerning the waiver of defendant's
Miranda rights, . . . upon essentially undisputed
facts, in particular the transcript of [an officer's]
colloquy with defendant," its conclusions present
questions of law which we review under a correction of
error standard.
State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 898 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting State
v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 817
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), cert, denied,

U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117

L.Ed.2d 507 (1992)).
2.

Did the court err in limiting the defense's cross-

examination of the State's only witness [Trooper Wassmer] and in
excluding evidence which cast doubt on the officer's testimony?

- 2
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See

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994) (the standard used for
the admission of evidence is analogized to a pasture which, while
involving considerable discretionary boundaries, ultimately presents
a question of law).
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND A WRITTEN OPINION
Although case law has addressed to some extent circumstances
involving pre-Miranda violations, the clarification responsibilities
of an officer who receives an equivocal responses to Miranda
warnings, and the need for a clear and informed waiver of rights, the
case at bar combines all such circumstances in a manner which
warrants discussion.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
failing to respond to officer's signal to stop, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5.

(R 147, 153).

On August 23, 1994, a preliminary hearing was held on the matter.
(R 170).

On September 26, 1994, Mr. Rogelio Limonta Leyva moved to

suppress evidence stemming from police misconduct, (R 205), and had
his motion denied on October 11, 1994.

(R 63-66; 244-48) . On

October 12, 1994, a jury convicted Mr. Leyva of the above offense.
(R 147).
On November 18, 1994, the court sentenced Mr. Rogelio Leyva
to an indeterminate term of zero to five years in prison, together
with a recoupment fee of $1,000.

(R 153).

The sentence began

forthwith and ran consecutively with other terms already imposed.
(R 153) .
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At approximately 9:00 p.m., July 24, 1994, highway trooper
John Wassmer was driving his patrol car "southbound on 1-15 in the
4500 South area."

(R 289-90).

Trooper Wassmer noticed ahead of him

on the highway a yellow vehicle which "was sagging badly to one
side."

(R 292). But see (R 340-41) (Gary Sebring, a friend of

Rogelio Leyva, noticed no sagging of the car or problems with the
suspension).

Trooper Wassmer contacted dispatch and requested a

registration check of the targeted vehicle's license plate.
209).

The license plate apparently belonged to a Buick.

(R 177,

(R 177,

210) .
Trooper Wassmer drove up beside the vehicle and observed
the driver, "a black man driving an old yellow car"

(R 184, 325).

Wassmer also determined that the car was an Oldsmobile.

(R 210).

Trooper Wassmer turned on the overhead red and blue strobe lights
and began to follow the Oldsmobile.

(R 178, 211). Trooper Wassmer

claimed that the car "increased its speed from 55 miles an hour to
75 miles an hour, plus, and started passing cars."

(R 179).

The highway patrol has a "high speed chase policy" which
requires the officer to balance the value of the suspected crime
against the potential danger involved in the chase.

(R 326-27).

In

order to further his investigation of the alleged class C
misdemeanor charge (the suspected license plate violation), Trooper
Wassmer asserted that it was necessary to engage in the high speed
chase.

(R 327). Wassmer also thought that the Oldsmobile had a

problem with its suspension, a suspected class C misdemeanor
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offense, which, in the officer's mind, set forth another basis for a
dangerous pursuit.

(R 325-27).

Trooper Wassmer claimed to have pursued the suspected
misdemeanant by turning on the police siren, and informing dispatch
of his actions.

(R 212).

Trooper Wassmer's story was that the

vehicle "was just jamming his way through the traffic, making people
take evasive type action, and at one point at 7200 South we started
down the offramp and then he cut back across the gore area there,
the painted island, and back on to the freeway.

He passed in the

emergency lane when all the lanes were occupied, much faster than
the traffic flow."

(R 212).

Despite the apparent high number of

involved persons, Trooper Wassmer was the only prosecution witness
brought forth to testify on the State's behalf.

(R 289-339).

Wassmer alleged that the high speed chase reached speeds
well over 70 miles an hour.

However, the trooper also testified

that at such purported high speeds he was at "a safe following
distance [,] [which was a few car lengths back,] . . . a second and a
half to two seconds behind which is considered a safe following
distance."

(R 327).

Wassmer said the pursuit ended "[w]hen [the

yellow Oldsmobile] went off the 90th South offramp, he again passed
a vehicle on the right in the emergency lane, and he was going way
too fast to take the turn at the bottom of the ramp, and he crashed
into the island."

(R 213).

The driver, Mr. Rogelio Leyva, remained seated in the
vehicle and put his hands in the air.
Wassmer drew his gun and approached.

- 5 -

(R 180, 213-14) . Trooper
(R 189; 214). A plain clothed

officer, who had arrived on the scene, also approached the
Oldsmobile.

(R 189). Trooper Wassmer arrested, handcuffed, and

searched Mr. Limonta Leyva.
Wassmer's patrol car.
scene.

(R 214, 298). He was placed in

(R 215). The

officers soon arrived on the

(R 189, 222).
Without advising Mr. Leyva of his Miranda rights, Trooper

Wassmer began questioning him with, "Why'd you run."
279).

(R 191, 224,

The reported response was "Plates on the wrong car".

(R 191). During the same pre-Miranda conversation, Wassmer said
Leyva admitted to being out on probation.

(R 192, 224).

Before

Miranda warnings were given, Trooper Wassmer further inquired about
an alleged controlled substance (cocaine) found at the scene.
(R 192) (Wassmer "went and sat in the [police] vehicle and asked him
[Leyva] specifically about it").
approximately

x

after 9:00 [.]"

The cocaine was discovered at

[t]en minutes after the chase began, at 18 minutes
(R 190) .

After the initial pre-Miranda discussion, "sometime later
when I [Trooper Wassmer] intended to do formal questioning[,]"
Wassmer decided to advise Mr. Limonta Leyva of his Miranda rights.
(R 192, 215). The time was 21:35 hours, about one half hour after
the actual time of the arrest.

(R 215. 223). The pre-Miranda

discussion led Trooper Wassmer to repeat his questioning, this time
after administering the Miranda warnings.
Following Trooper Wassmer7s reading of the Miranda
warnings, he asked Mr. Leyva if he understood them.

He said yes.

(R 216). Trooper Wassmer then asked if he wanted to talk to us
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now.

(R 193-94, 216). Having already made pre-Miranda statements

to the officer, Mr. Leyva responded, "I don't know."

(R 193, 216).

"I [Trooper Wassmer] informed him [Mr. Leyva] in plain language that
he didn't have to talk to me if he didn't want to, it was up to
him.

And he nodded."

(R 193, 217).

"I [Trooper Wassmer] considered that a waiver, that he
wanted to talk to me at that point, so I asked him [questions.]"
(R 217). The questioning again included, "So why did you run?"
(R 217). Mr. Leyva responded, "The plate's on the wrong car" and
that he's "out past time", made in reference to probation.
225).

(R 217,

Wassmer also asked about the cocaine, to which Mr. Leyva

denied having any knowledge.

(R 217-19, 225).

At the motion to suppress proceeding, held in regards to
"all statements given to the police officers at or after the time of
arrest [,]" (R 23-24, 245); see also (Addendum B ) ; the State
expressed its intention of not "bringing out out any of that
conversation before Miranda."

(R 231). However, the State still

sought to introduce the post-Miranda discussion which essentially
repeated the pre-Miranda questions and answers.

(R 217-19).

In its

ruling, the court sided with the State:
The state has the burden of showing at least by a
preponderance, based on the totality of the
circumstances, that the defendant voluntarily,
knowingly waived his right to remain silent
post-Miranda[.] This determination may be based upon
the defendant's words and actions.
Here the defendant unequivocally waived his right
to remain silent by demonstrating his assent to answer
questions by nodding his head up and down and
answering the officer's questions without any
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"arguably equivocal" invocation of his right to
silence.
After the officer sought to clarify the "I don't
know" response of the defendant, the further statement
of the officer at that point in time was simply, in
this Court's view, an effort to clarify his "I don't
know" response.
The motion to suppress statements made after the
Miranda warning, therefore, is denied.
The defendant's motion in limine regarding the
statement "out past time" however, in this Court's
view, ought to be and is therefore granted. The
statement infers that the defendant was on probation
or parole at the time of the arrest, but its probative
value is questionable, and in this Court's view, it's
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice[.] Accordingly, this Court will limit that
statement from trial in this matter.
This Court is persuaded that the defendant's
statements were voluntarily and knowingly given
without coercion or improper conduct on the part of
the arresting officer.
(R 246-48) (citations omitted).
At trial, 2 Mr. Leyva attempted to impeach Trooper Wassmer's
credibility by revealing that he failed to give Miranda warnings and
improperly elicited incriminating statements from Mr. Leyva.
(R 3 06).

The trial court, though, refused to allow such cross

examination.

"I've ruled that pre-Miranda statements were not

admissible, and now to attempt to show the officer omitted these
statements from his report, while probative as bearing upon his
credibility, is substantially outweighed, in my view, by the danger
of misleading or confusing the jury.

Therefore, the questioning

2. Prior to trial, the State dismissed the charge dealing
with possession of cocaine due to problems with the chain of custody.
(R 172) .
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about the claimed omission of the pre-Miranda statements from the
officer's statements is disallowed[.]"
appeals the trial court's rulings.

(R 315-16).

Mr. Leyva

See Addendum C.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court, the State, and Mr. Rogelio Leyva all agree
that when Trooper Wassmer first questioned Mr. Leyva while he was in
custody, the officer had not yet administered Miranda warnings.

The

initial police illegality appropriately required suppression of the
pre-Miranda discussion.

Still in dispute, however, is whether the

State established both that Mr. Leyva had understood his Miranda
rights and that he also voluntarily waived them.

The State showed

only an understanding; it did not prove a voluntary waiver.

Without

a waiver, a key circumstance distinguishing Mr. Leyva's situation
from other case law, all of Rogelio's statements to Trooper Wassmer
should have been suppressed.
The trial court similarly erred in not allowing Mr. Leyva
to cross-examine Trooper Wassmer about the initial police illegality
and about omitting such violations from his police report.

While

the court acknowledged that such evidence did in fact bear upon
Trooper Wassmer's credibility, it erred in preventing Mr. Leyva from
using such impeachment material to attack the officer's credibility
and the substance of his testimony.

- 9 -

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING IMPROPERLY ELICITED
STATEMENTS WHICH FOLLOWED TROOPER WASSMER f S
PRE-MIRANDA VIOLATIONS AND THE OFFICERS FAILURE TO
BOTH CLARIFY AN EQUIVOCAL RESPONSE AND OBTAIN A PROPER
WAIVER
"No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself, . . ."
Utah Const, art. I, § 12.

U.S. Const, amend. V; accord

"[T]he prosecution may not use

statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination."

State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 971

(Utah App. 1993) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966)) .

"[T]hese safeguards 'come into play whenever a person in

custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional
equivalent.7"

Hayes, 860 P.2d at 971 (quoting Rhode Island v.

Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980)).
In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute that
Mr. Rogelio Leyva was in custody.

(R 190, 196-97, 231-32) .

Following the claimed chase and crash, (R 213), Trooper Wassmer drew
his gun and aimed it at the driver as he approached the Oldsmobile.
(R 189). A plain clothed policeman also was present and back-up
officers soon arrived at the scene.

(R 189, 214, 298). Mr. Leyva

put his hands in the air and offered no resistance.

(R 180). He

was immediately arrested, handcuffed, and searched by Trooper
Wassmer.

(R 180) ("I

[Trooper Wassmer] handcuffed him and took him
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out of the car and searched him and then placed him in my vehicle").
The manner in which Mr. Leyva's subsequent statements were
elicited remains in question, however, because Miranda warnings were
not initially given and after Miranda warnings were finally
conveyed, there still existed problems with the waiver.
According to the court, "Proper Miranda warnings were
administered to the defendant by Trooper Wassmer[,]" (R 65)
(Conclusion of Law No. 3); "The defendant understood his Miranda
rights[,]" (R 65) (Conclusion of Law No. 4 ) ; and "The defendant
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights
before questioning ensued."

(R 65) (Conclusion of Law No. 5). The

court's rulings are in error.
"A waiver of Miranda rights may be inferred from a
defendant's 'actions and words,' and is based on the 'totality of
the circumstances.'"

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 940-41 (Utah 1994)

(citations omitted).

The court below, however, failed to properly

incorporate all of the involved circumstances.

(R 63-65).

Important circumstances include the initial police illegality; the
extent to which the taint of the initial illegality affected the
waiver of the Miranda warnings; whether the Miranda warnings were in
fact waived; and the officer's failure to properly clarify
Mr. Leyva's remarks.
A.

STATEMENTS ELICITED BY AN OFFICER WHO FAILS
TO GIVE MIRANDA WARNINGS ARE TAINTED AND
CANNOT BE RE-ELICITED ABSENT PROOF OF A
VOLUNTARY AND ATTENUATED WAIVER

"One of the factors that can vitiate the voluntariness of a

- 11 -

subsequent confession is the hopeless feeling of an accused that he
has nothing to lose by repeating his confession[.]"

Oregon v.

Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 325 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

The

general rule incorporates the use of the following metaphor:
after an accused has once let the cat out of the bag
by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is
never thereafter free of the psychological and
practical disadvantages of having confessed. He can
never get the cat back in the bag. The secret is out
for good. In such a sense, a later confession may
always be looked upon as fruit of the first.
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 311 (quoting United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S.
532, 540 (1947)); accord State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291 (Utah 1992)
(said another way, "First, the court must determine 'voluntariness,'
i.e. whether the confession was voluntary; second, the court must
determine 'attenuation,7 i.e. whether the confession was obtained in
the course of police exploitation of the prior illegality, . . . " ) ;
see infra note 5.
In the case at bar, Trooper Wassmer's pre-Miranda
interrogation caused Rogelio Limonta Leyva to let the cat out of the
bag.

(R 191, 224, 279).

" [H]aving already 'let the cat out of the

bag', a subsequent Miranda warning has little significance."

State

v. Lavaris, 664 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Wash. 1983).
As a practical matter, Miranda warnings are of little
use to a person who has already confessed. A person
in this position is likely to think "[w]hat use is a
lawyer? What good is a lawyer now? What benefit can
a lawyer tell me? I've already told the police
everything?"
Lavaris, 664 P.2d at 1239 (citation omitted).
In Lavaris, the defendant confessed to a murder during an

- 12 -

initial police interview.

The detectives, however, had not yet

given Miranda warnings to Lavaris.

664 P.2d at 1236.

Approximately

45 minutes later after the police had finally advised Lavaris of his
Miranda warnings,3 Lavaris "gave a detailed account of his
participation in the murder."

Id.

The trial court suppressed

Lavaris' pre-Miranda statements, but it "admitted all statements
made by [Lavaris] after he had been informed of his Miranda
rights."

Id. at 1237.
On appeal, the Washington supreme court reversed.

The

post-Miranda statements were inadmissible as well.
once a criminal defendant has let the "cat out of the
bag", the subsequent giving of Miranda warnings alone
will not erase the taint inherently associated with
the pre-Miranda confession. Absent some kind of
insulating factor to separate the two confessions, the
second confession is as inadmissible as the first.
Lavaris, 664 P.2d at 1235.

Since there was no break in the

causative chain between the pre-Miranda and post-Miranda confessions
and the defendant did not know that earlier statements made prior to
the Miranda warnings could not be used against him, "the second
confession suffered from the same infirmity as the first."
1238.

l^d. at

"Having let the 'cat out of the bag', the psychological

damage was done; the subsequent Miranda warnings could not undo that
damage."

^d. at 1239; accord State v. Erho, 463 P.2d 779 (Wash.

3. Prior to the first police interview, "the detectives
had already determined [Lavaris] could speak and understand
English." Lavaris, 664 P.2d at 1236. Nevertheless, they requested
a bilingual officer who, approximately 45 minutes after the first
police interview, finally advised Lavaris of his Miranda rights in
both Spanish and English. Id.

- 13 -

1970); cf. infra Point I.B.
Lavaris has since been cited by Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298, 310 n.2 (1985), although the court there reached a contrary
conclusion and it cautioned that such metaphors should not be used
out of context.

Ld. at 3 04, 318.

Elstad is not controlling here,

however, because of the limited nature of its holding and the
differences in the circumstances.4
In Elstad, investigating officers were interviewing Michael
Elstad for his suspected involvement in a burglary.

During the

questioning, an officer "told Mr. Elstad that I felt he was involved
in that and he looked at me and stated, 'Yes, I was there.'"
U.S. at 3 02.

470

The officers took Elstad to police headquarters and

then for the first time advised Elstad of his Miranda rights.

Id.

The reverse side of the [Miranda] card carried three
questions in boldface and recorded Elstad7s responses:
"DO YOU UNDERSTAND THESE RIGHTS? 'Yeh'
"DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS? 'No'
"HAVING THESE RIGHTS IN MIND, DO YOU WISH TO TALK
TO US NOW? 'Yeh I do! ' "
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 315 n.4.

Elstad gave a full statement of his

involvement, which was typed and read back by the officers, and then

4. Cf. State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291 (Utah 1992) (Elstad's
limited holding and its factual limitation would be inapplicable
considerations under the following standard -- which accords and
combines the law applicable to the totality of Mr. Leyva's
circumstances -- "First, the court must determine 'voluntariness,'
i.e. whether the confession was voluntary; second, the court must
determine 'attenuation,' i.e. whether the confession was obtained in
the course of police exploitation of the prior illegality, . . . " ) .
As discussed above, Mr. Leyva's confession was involuntary because
of the manner in which it was obtained, particularly the initial
police illegality and the lack of an appropriate waiver.
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signed by Elstad.

Jd. at 301-02.

At trial, Elstad attempted to suppress all of his oral and
written statements.

The trial judge suppressed his pre-Miranda

statements although it allowed his post-Miranda confession.
3 02.

Jd. at

On appeal, the Oregon court of appeals reversed whereupon the

United States supreme court "granted certiorari to consider the
question whether the Self-incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment requires the suppression of a confession, made after
proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights, solely because
the police had obtained an earlier voluntary but unwarned admission
from the defendant."

Elstad, 470 U.S. at 303 (emphasis added).

The

court held:
When police ask questions of a suspect in custody
without administering the required warnings, Miranda
dictates that the answers received be presumed
compelled and that they be excluded from evidence at
trial in the State's case in chief. The Court has
carefully adhered to this principle . . . [although]
[n]o further purpose is served by imputing "taint" to
subsequent statements obtained pursuant to a voluntary
and knowing waiver. We hold today that a suspect who
has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive
questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his
rights and confessing after he has been given the
requisite Miranda warnings.
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 317-18 (emphasis added).
As in Elstad, the case at bar leaves no question that the
pre-Miranda statements elicited by the officers should be suppressed.
470 U.S. at 310, 318.

Before any Miranda warnings were

administered, Trooper Wassmer asked Rogelio Leyva, "Why'd you run?"
(R 191, 224, 279). Rogelio responded, "Plates on the wrong car".
(R 191) .

During the same pre-Miranda interrogation, Mr. Leyva also
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acknowledged that he was out on probation.

(R 192, 224). Trooper

Wassmer further inquired about cocaine found at the scene.

(R 192)

(Wassmer "went and sat in the [police] vehicle and asked him [Leyva]
specifically about it").

Since Miranda warning were never given,

the trial court properly excluded the pre-Miranda discussion.
(R 314) (the lower court "ruled that the questioning before the
Miranda warning was excluded originally . . . because the State
agreed not to introduce such statements and because eliciting
inculpatory statements prior to giving Miranda are properly
excludable"); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.
But, unlike in Elstad which contained no issue about
whether the defendant had understood his rights or whether he did in
fact desire to speak with officers, 470 U.S. at 301, 315 n.4, the
"totality of the circumstances" for Rogelio Leyva cannot ignore such
issues.

Instead, the circumstances surrounding the initial police

illegality and the additional circumstances involving the ensuing
questions (by Trooper Wassmer) and answers (by Rogelio Leyva) must
all be considered together in determining whether Mr. Leyva did in
fact "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda
rights before questioning ensued."

(R 65) (Conclusion of Law No.

5); see infra Point I.B; cf. State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1017
(Utah 1993) ("defendant [James] suddenly and impulsively confessed
his crime when asked about his employment[,]" whereas the
inculpatory statements elicited here resulted from Trooper Wassmer's
specific focus on the alleged offense and were followed by
clarification and waiver problems).

- 16 -

B.

WHEN A DEFENDANT RESPONDS EQUIVOCALLY TO THE
MIRANDA WARNINGS, THE OFFICER MUST BOTH
CLARIFY HIS RESPONSE AND VERIFY HIS
UNDERSTANDING AS TO WHETHER HE IS STILL
WILLING TO WAIVE THOSE RIGHTS

In addition to the above circumstance, see supra Point
I.A., another factor vitiating the voluntariness of a subsequent
confession is a defendant's equivocal response to an officer's
reading of the Miranda warnings.

See State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d

1100, 1103 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991),
cert, denied,

U.S. ---, 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992);

State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894 (Utah App. 1993).
In Sampson, after the police had read Miranda warnings to
defendant Sampson, the following exchange occurred:
[Detective]: Okay, having these rights in mind do you
wish to talk to me now.
Sampson: Well, uh, should I have a lawyer, I mean,
well, I'm really not worried about anything, it is
just that . . .
[Detective]: Okay, if you are not worried about
anything I would say that is fine, let's go ahead and
proceed. Let's get -this thing done and get it over
with and see what we can do.
Sampson:

I'm willing to get it over with.

Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1102; see also id. ("Defendant then read and
signed a form listing his Miranda rights and indicating his
willingness to take the polygraph test").
In response to defendant Sampson's motion to suppress, "the
trial court found, that defendant's statement, 'Well, ah, should I
have a lawyer, I mean, well, I'm really not worried about anything,
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it is just that . . .' did not qualify as even an equivocal request
for counsel which the police had to be concerned about."
808 P.2d at 1108.

Sampson,

On appeal, this Court disagreed with the lower

court's conclusion.
Finding defendant Sampson's statement "an equivocal request
for counsel [,]" id. at 1111, this Court held that "it was necessary
that someone clarify that equivocal request before defendant could
be subjected to custodial interrogation.

Defendant's request was

never clarified and, consequently, the state failed to demonstrate a
valid waiver of defendant's right to counsel."

Id.5

"The fact that defendant continued to answer questions was
not a sufficient indication that he was abandoning his right to
counsel."

^d. at 1111.

Sampson's "subsequent statement that he was

'willing to get it over with' was [not] sufficient to clarify his
position and to demonstrate a waiver of his right to counsel."

Id.

at 1110.

5. The Sampson opinion initially noted "that, though a
defendant may waive his rights to remain silent and to have an
attorney present during custodial interrogation, 'these waivers must
be both intentional and made with full knowledge of the
consequences, and the defendant is given the benefit of every
reasonable presumption against such a waiver.'" State v. Sampson,
808 P.2d 1100, 1108 (Utah App. 1990). Such a waiver is consistent
with the need for intervening factors, see Point I.B., as well as
the exception to the general rule quoted above. See supra
Point I.A. (Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311 (1985) (quoting
United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947)); Elstad, 470 U.S.
at 312 ("this Court has never gone so far as to hold that making a
confession under circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually
disables the confessor from making a usable one after those
conditions have been remove").
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Similarly, in Mr. Leyva's case, there existed insufficient
clarification and an inadequate waiver of his Miranda rights.
Together with the continuing effect of the pre-Miranda violation,
see supra Point I.A., after the Miranda warnings were finally given,
"Trooper Wassmer asked the defendant if he would answer questions.
The defendant stated 'I don't know.'"

(R 64) (Finding of Fact

No. 11). This exchange closely resembles the Sampson discussion.
[Detective]: Okay, having these rights in mind do you
wish to talk to me now.
Sampson: Well, uh, should I have a lawyer, I mean,
well, I'm really not worried about anything, it is
just that . . .
Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1102.
The next series of statements share additional
similarities.

"Trooper Wassmer said 'You don't have to answer

questions if you don't want to.

It's up to you.'

nodded his head in an affirmative manner."
No. 11) .

The defendant

(R 64) (Finding of Fact

The defendant in Sampson also responded affirmatively to

the officer's assurances:
[Detective]: Okay, if you are not worried about
anything I would say that is fine, let's go ahead and
proceed. Let's get this thing done and get it over
with and see what we can do.
Sampson:

I'm willing to get it over with.

Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1102.
Unlike in Sampson where the defendant was at least afforded
further time for pause and reflection in order to sign a written
waiver, see id. ("[Sampson] then read and signed a form listing his
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Miranda rights and indicating his willingness to take the polygraph
test"), in Mr. Leyva's case, Trooper Wassmer proceeded immediately
with requestioning without even obtaining anything in writing.
(R 217) ("I

[Trooper Wassmer] considered that a waiver, that he

wanted to talk to me at that point, so I asked him [the
questions.]").

If the expressed willingness and signed waiver in

Sampson was held to be insufficient, the mere nodding of the head
here should likewise be deemed inadequate.
"[T]he state has a heavy burden to establish both that a
defendant understood his Miranda rights and that he voluntarily
waived them."
1990).

State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1108 (Utah App.

At best, Trooper Wassmer's brief exchange with Mr. Leyva

established only an understanding that "It's up to you."

The

accompanying requirement, however, of a voluntary waiver of the
Miranda rights was not established.

See id. at 1108 (quoting State

v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1211 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S.
1044 (1988) ("these waivers must be both intentional and made with
full knowledge of the consequences, and the defendant is given the
benefit of every reasonable presumption against such a waiver"));
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (the individual must both "waive these
rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement").
As in Sampson, the officer here failed to sufficiently
clarify both Mr. Leyva's understanding and his waiver of the Miranda
rights.

Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1108; see also id. at 1111 ("it was

necessary that someone clarify that equivocal request before
defendant could be subjected to custodial interrogation"); i_d. at
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1110 (Sampson's "subsequent statement that he was 'willing to get it
over with' was [not] sufficient to clarify his position and to
demonstrate a waiver of his right to counsel"); Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298 (1985) (Elstad lacked the clarification and waiver
concerns present in the case at bar, particularly Mr. Leyva's
equivocal response, "I don't know", made in reference to the
officer's reading of the Miranda rights); Miranda, 384 U.S. 475
("Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible").
State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894 (Utah App. 1993), followed
the principles in Sampson and reasserted the importance of
clarification.

Gutierrez, 864 P.2d at 901 ("we hold that the

clarification approach adopted by Utah courts for evaluating
equivocal invocation of the right to counsel applies equally in the
context of equivocal invocation of the right to remain silent").
Key facts from Gutierrez include the following:
After informing defendant [Lana Marie Gutierrez] of
her Miranda rights, the detectives asked her if she
understood those rights. Defendant answered, "Yes, I
do." Detective Potter then asked her if she were
willing to talk to them without consulting an attorney
or having an attorney present. Defendant responded,
"Yes. Everything's cool."
During the interrogation, defendant denied having
an altercation with the victim. . . . When Detective
Potter challenged the truthfulness of this statement,
defendant repeatedly denied that she was lying and
then retorted, "I ain't got to listen to you, okay."
Detective Potter answered, "No, you don't."
Gutierrez, 864 P.2d at 897 (emphasis added by the court).

The

interrogation continued, with Gutierrez uttering another equivocal
response which was followed by the detective's assurances:
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[Detective]: Well . . . we know what happened. If
you want to tell us what happened and . . . get this
thing . . . .
Defendant: You think what you want to think.
got to say nothin'.
[Detective]:

I ain't

You don't have to.

Defendant: That's right. I . . . do you know what?
You think what you want to think
[Detective]: Well . . . we know and ya know, you're
not helping yourself is what we're saying. If you
want to help yourself . . . great. Ya know.

Defendant: Well, okay . . . I did it. But, he
started hittin' me and shit, so I hit him back.
Gutierrez, 864 P.2d at 897 (emphasis added by the court).
Gutierrez moved to suppress her incriminating statements
and the trial court denied the motion.

3[d.

This Court reversed.

"Having determined that defendant's incriminating statements
followed an 'arguably equivocal' invocation of this right, we
reverse defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial."
896-97.

Id.

Importantly, the officer's response, "You don't have to"

failed to sufficiently clarify Ms. Gutierrez's equivocal remarks:
Because defendant's remark, "I ain't got to say
nothin," constituted an "arguably equivocal"
invocation of her right to terminate questioning, the
officers interrogating her were required to clarify
this statement. The transcript of the interrogation
shows that the officers instead responded, "You don't
have to," and then continued their interrogation.
Although this response indicates an acknowledgement of
a right to remain silent, it did not serve to clarify
defendant's intent in making this remark. As a
result, defendant's ensuing confession was obtained in
violation of her fifth amendment rights and the trial
court erred in allowing its admission into evidence.
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Gutierrez, 864 P.2d at 902.
Trooper Wassmer's responses similarly indicated nothing
more than a mere acknowledgement of Mr. Leyva's Miranda rights.
When "Trooper Wassmer asked [Rogelio] if he would answer
questions [,]" Mr. Leyva's responded equivocally: "I don't know".
(R 64) (Finding of Fact No. 11). Like the acknowledgement in
Gutierrez, "Trooper Wassmer said 'You don't have to answer questions
if you don't want to.

It's up to you.'"

(R 64) (Finding of Fact

No. 11); cf. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d at 897 (the detectives assured
Gutierrez, "No, you don't [have to listen]" and "You don't have to
[say anything]").

As in Gutierrez,6 however, the officer's

acknowledgement did not serve to clarify Mr. Leyva's intent in
making the remark.

864 P.2d at 902. A mere nodding of the head was

not an appropriate clarification.

See id.; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479

(emphasis added) (individual must both "waive these rights and agree
to answer questions or make a statement"); 384 U.S. at 470 (citation
omitted) ("We cannot penalize a defendant who, not understanding his
constitutional rights, does not make the formal request and by such
failure demonstrates his helplessness").
Moreover, another circumstance absent from Gutierrez but
present in the case at bar was the officer's failure to initially

6. In Gutierrez and in the case at bar, the officers
already possessed some leverage or knowledge about the offense prior
to the confession. Compare Gutierrez, 864 P.2d at 897 (wherein the
detectives proclaimed, "Well . . . we know what happened. If you
want to tell us what happened . . . " ) , with (R 217-19) (in
Mr. Leyva's case, Trooper Wassmer's improper pre-Miranda
interrogation already had caused Rogelio to let the "cat out of the
bag.") .
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give Miranda warnings to Mr. Leyva.

(R 314). By comparison, in

Gutierrez, Miranda warnings were not only initially administered,
there was no doubt that Ms. Gutierrez had understood them.

See 864

P.2d at 897 (when asked if she understood the rights, she answered,
"Yes, I do[,]" and when asked if she was willing to talk to the
police without an attorney, she responded,

ff

Yes[,] Everything's

cool").
The principles underlying State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100,
1103 (Utah App. 1990), and State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894 (Utah
App. 1993), together with the circumstances surrounding Trooper
Wassmer's initial illegality, see supra Point I.A., should govern
the case at bar.

By contrast, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S.

129 L.Ed.2d 362, 368, 114 S.Ct.

(1994), is distinguishable from

Mr. Leyva's situation.
In Davis, naval investigative services (NIS) interviewed
petitioner Davis about his suspected involvement in a murder.

The

factual background is important:
As required by military law, the [NIS] agents advised
[Davis] that he was a suspect in the killing, that he
was not required to make a statement, that any
statement could be used against him at a trial by
court-martial, and that he was entitled to speak with
an attorney and have an attorney present during
questioning.
[Davis] waived his rights to remain
silent and to counsel, both orally and in writing.
About an hour and a half into the interview,
[Davis] said, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer."
NIS agents]:

[The

[m]ade it very clear that we're not here to violate
his rights, that if he wants a lawyer, then we will
stop any kind of questioning with him, that we
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,

weren't going to pursue the matter unless we have
it clarified is he asking for a lawyer or is he
just making comment about a lawyer, and he said,
[']No, I'm not asking for a lawyer,' and then he
continued on, and said, 'No, I don't want a
lawyer.'"
Davis, 129 L.Ed.2d at 368 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
Davis moved to suppress his statements, but his motion was denied.
On appeal to the United States supreme court, the high
court affirmed the lower court denials.
The courts below found that [Davis'] remark to the
NIS agents -- "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" -- was
not a request for counsel, and we see no reason to
disturb that conclusion. The NIS agents therefore
were not required to stop questioning [Davis], though
it was entirely proper for them to clarify whether
[Davis] in fact wanted a lawyer.
Id. at 373.
Importantly, the remark, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer",
occurred after Davis already had "waived his rights to remain silent
and to counsel, both orally and in writing."
368.

Davis, 129 L.Ed.2d at

Hence, in Davis, unlike in Mr. Leyva's case, a waiver of the

Miranda rights was a non-issue in the totality of the circumstances.
Left intact under Davis, however, was the long-standing
requirement of an initial and valid waiver.

Id., at 370 ("If the

suspect effectively waives his right to counsel after receiving the
Miranda warnings, law enforcement officers are free to question
him").

Although the Davis opinion declined to require "officers to

cease questioning immediately upon the making of an ambiguous or
equivocal reference to an attorney," _id. at 372, the requirements of
properly administering and waiving Miranda rights were not forgotten:
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the primary protection afforded suspects subject to
custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings
themselves. "[F]ull comprehension of the rights to
remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient
to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the
interrogation process." A suspect who knowingly and
voluntarily waives his right to counsel after having
that right explained to him has indicated his
willingness to deal with the police unassisted.
Davis, 129 L.Ed.2d at 372 (citations omitted).
While an officer may not need to cease questioning when a
suspect makes an equivocal request for counsel, the accompanying
requirement of a valid waiver remains in force.

J^d.

Moreover, an

equivocal response to Miranda warnings is a completely different
issue, requiring clarification at the outset as a prerequisite to
any questioning (versus renewed questioning, see supra Point I.A.,
or questioning following ambiguous invocations of the right to
counsel, see Davis 129 L.Ed.2d 362).
Here, "Trooper Wassmer asked [Rogelio Leyva] if he would
answer questions.

[Mr. Leyva] stated 'I don't know.'"

(Finding of Fact No. 11).

"Trooper Wassmer said 'You don't have to

answer questions if you don't want to.

It's up to you.'

[Mr. Leyva] nodded his head in an affirmative manner."
(Finding of Fact No. 11).

(R 64)

(R 64)

"I [Trooper Wassmer] considered that a

waiver, that he wanted to talk to me at that point, so I asked him
[the questions.]"

(R 217).

Trooper Wassmer's wrongful assumption resulted in an
invalid waiver.

"[T]he state [did not carry its] heavy burden to

establish both that a defendant understood his Miranda rights and
that he voluntarily waived them."

State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100,
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1108 (Utah App. 1990).

Nodding his head reflected only an

understanding; there was no waiver.

See also Miranda, 384 U.S. at

475 (the individual must both "waive these rights and agree to
answer questions or make a statement"); Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1108
("though a defendant may waive his rights to remain silent and to
have an attorney present during custodial interrogation, 'these
waivers must be both intentional and made with full knowledge of the
consequences, and the defendant is given the benefit of every
reasonable presumption against such a waiver.'"); 384 U.S. 475
("Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible").
In sum, the lack of waiver circumstance7 present in Rogelio
Leyva's case distinguishes Elstad and Davis in a factual and legal
context and the invalid waiver here provides an appropriate basis
for maintaining the principles in Sampson and Gutierrez to the

7. Another circumstance involves Trooper Wassmer's
unrecorded conversation with Mr. Leyva. (R 64) (Findings of Fact
No. 13). Over objections from Mr. Leyva, the trial court held,
"Trooper Wassmer's in the field unrecorded questioning of the
defendant did not violate any of the defendant's constitutional
rights."
(R 65) (Conclusion of Law No. 7 ) . Mr. Leyva now
acknowledges the correctness of this conclusion. See State v.
Villarreal, 256 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 31 (Utah 1995) ("Notwithstanding
the desirability of recording confessions, it is neither practicable
nor possible to require contemporaneous recordings in all
instances"); £f. id. at 3 0 ("electronic or other recording of a
confession is a simple and inexpensive means of preserving critical
evidence in an accurate form and should be implemented wherever
possible"); State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1018 (Utah App. 1993)
("Absent legislation or precedent from the Utah Supreme Court, we do
not believe it would be appropriate to require, by judicial fiat,
that all statements taken of a person in custody be recorded or
transcribed").
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extent that they do not conflict with applicable federal
limitations.

C£. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 301, 315 n.4 (no issue existed

there as to whether the defendant understood his rights and he
clearly wanted to speak with officers); Davis, 129 L.Ed.2d 362, 368
(emphasis added) (the Davis officers "weren't going to pursue the
matter [questioning] unless we have it clarified is he asking for a
lawyer or is he just making a comment about a lawyer, and he said,
[']No, I'm not asking for a lawyer,' and then he continued on, and
said, 'No, I don't want a lawyer.'").
Contrary to the lower court's conclusion,8 Mr. Leyva did
not "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily [waive] his Miranda
rights before questioning ensued."

(R 65) (Conclusion of Law

No. 5 ) . His post-Miranda statements should have been suppressed.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 481-82 (the Miranda decision and its
companion cases were reversed despite the existence "of considerable
evidence against each defendant[,]" including eyewitness

8. A "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" waiver of the
Miranda rights entails a very probing inquiry:
The inquiry has two distinct dimensions. First, the
relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary
in the sense that it was the product of a free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion,
or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made
with a full awareness of both the nature of the right
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision
to abandon it. Only if the "totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation" reveals
both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of
comprehension may a court properly conclude that the
Miranda rights have been waived.
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (quoting Fare v. Michael
C , 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)).
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identifications); see also Point II (the court's erroneous admission
of the post-Miranda statements was compounded by its order limiting
Mr. Leyva's cross-examination and the circumstances which would have
fully apprised the jury of the pertinent context); State v. Thurman,
846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993) ("The principle underlying the
exploitation test is that the Fourth Amendment should not permit law
enforcement to 'ratify their own illegal conduct by merely obtaining
a consent after the illegality has occurred'").
POINT II
THE COURT IMPROPERLY PREVENTED MR. LEYVA FROM
CROSS-EXAMINING TROOPER WASSMER ABOUT FACTORS
AFFECTING HIS CREDIBILITY, THUS LEAVING THE JURY WITH
THE MISTAKEN IMPRESSION THAT IT HAD NO REASON TO DOUBT
THE OFFICER1S STORY
The lower court "ruled that the questioning before the
Miranda warning was excluded originally . . . because the State
agreed not to introduce such statements and because eliciting
inculpatory statements prior to giving Miranda are properly
excludable."

(R 314); accord State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 898

n. 2 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted) ("We agree that the
questioning of defendant constituted "interrogation," defined as
actions or words by a police officer which the officer 'should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.'"); see supra Point I.
However, the State still sought to introduce a post-Miranda
discussion which essentially repeated the pre-Miranda questions and
answers.

(R 217-19).

The pre-Miranda and post-Miranda discussions

elicited inculpatory statements, references to being out on
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probation, and innuendos regarding cocaine possession.

(R 191,

192, 217-19) . Despite the above concerns, see supra Point I,
the court admitted "questions and answers given post-Miranda . . .
in the trial."

(R 65) (Conclusion of Law No. 6); (R 311-12) (the

court intimated that if it admitted evidence of the officer's
Miranda violation, it also would admit the references to probation
and cocaine).
Since the post-Miranda inculpatory statements were not
excluded, at trial Mr. Leyva attempted to raise questions about the
officer's credibility by showing what had happened before the
Miranda warnings were finally given.

(R 316) (Mr. Leyva wanted to

ask Trooper Wassmer if he elicited incriminating questions before
the Miranda warnings "because it establishes both that [Trooper
Wassmer] is breaking the law and that he's also excluding that from
his report which is supposed to be documenting this case").

The

initial police illegality were considerations which the jury was
entitled to consider in determining the substance of the State's
claims.
The court below, however, precluded Mr. Leyva from
attacking Trooper Wassmer's credibility during cross-examination.
(R 317).

According to the court, "I've ruled that pre-Miranda

statements were not admissible, and now to attempt to show the
officer [Trooper Wassmer] omitted these statements from his report,
while probative as bearing upon his credibility, is substantially
outweighed, in my view, by the danger of misleading or confusing the
jury."

(R 316).

The court's ruling was in error.
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The right of cross-examination is an integral part
of the right of confrontation, which is guaranteed by
Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah and the
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States. The cross-examination of a witness,
testifying against the accused, provides a means of
attacking his credibility and thus the substance of
his testimony.
State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Utah 1980); Utah Const.
art. I, § 12; U.S. Amend. VI.
The general rule is that " [a]11 relevant evidence is
admissible, . . . "

Utah R. Evid. 402.

"Although relevant, evidence

may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, . . . "

Utah R. Evid. 403.

In contrast to the

court's ruling, without the excluded and undisputed evidence
undermining Trooper Wassmer's credibility, the jury had no reason
not to believe the State's lone witness.

(R 289-339).

The jury was

misled into believing that Trooper Wassmer simply "did his job" and
that there should be no questions about his testimony.

See, e.g.,

(R 292-301).9
For example, during closing argument, the State summarily
discounted defense claims impinging Trooper Wassmer's credibility
and it repeatedly vouched for the officer in its arguments to the
jury:

9. The court erroneously stated that Mr. Leyva had
explored the full extent of Trooper Wassmer's pre-Miranda violations
and the nature of the omissions from his police report, (R 320),
when in fact Mr. Leyva's narrow questioning of the officer dealt
with other issues. (R 318-20; 363-65).
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[The State]:
[Mr. Leyva] mentioned that the officer
must simply be wrong, that it [the Oldsmobile] wasn't
sagging because Gary Sebring earlier that day when it
was parked didn't see it sagging.
[[B]ecause there's
somebody who earlier that day did not see a sagging
car, somehow we should distrust the officer.] Well, I
don't know how valid that is.

[Mr. Leyva is] concerned that the officer didn't
tell dispatch he was going to stop the car for a
safety violation. Well, that wasn't his testimony.

[Mr. Leyva] tells us it's incredible that the
officer chased the Defendant for just a misdemeanor.
Again, I don't see how the evidence can support that
whatsoever.
the officer testified he was travelling in the
left-hand lane, but admitted at some point he went
over to the right-hand lane. So what? Of course he
was in the left-hand lane. Of course at some point he
went to the right-hand lane because the Defendant was
driving off the highway. That means that somehow you
can't trust the officer?
Finally, there are many mentions of lying, although
I didn't hear Counsel specifically say this is what
the officer was lying about. [Counsel], of course,
intimated he was lying. I didn't hear any lies. You
didn't hear any lies. What you heard was a
professional, experienced officer who was doing what
he's paid to do, to patrol the streets of this
community on a night when every one of us were out
holidaying and partying. He was doing his job, and
for anyone to suggest on this evidence that he was
lying, I say they're completely wrong.
You heard his [Trooper Wassmer] testimony. You saw
him testify. You saw him under cross-examination.
You know what kind of a man he is. He did his duty.
He did his job.
(R 355-58) (emphasis added)
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Due to the court's limitations on Mr. Leyva's crossexamination, however, the jury did not really know "what kind of man
[Trooper Wassmer] is", nor was the jury able to consider the
undisputed Miranda violations which reflected upon how Wassmer "did
his job."

(R 358); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492 (Vignera v. New York, a

companion case to, and explained within, the Miranda opinion noted
that the lack of Miranda warnings required reversal and it also
indicated the important circumstance that in Vignera's original
trial, "The defense was precluded from making any showing that
warnings had not been given").

"Since the trial court unduly

restricted defendant in the exercise of his constitutional right of
cross-examination, the review thereof is controlled by the
constitutional harmless error standard of Chapman v. California [,
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)]."

State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228, 1233

(Utah 1980); 621 P.2d at 1233 ("This standard compels reversal
unless the reviewing court can declare a belief that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt").
Trooper Wassmer was the State's only witness and his
testimony cannot be considered cumulative evidence.

(R 289-339).

The officer's testimony was the only means through which the State
could meet its burden of proof.

As defense counsel argued,

He's [Trooper Wassmer] not bringing you any proof
other than his own word. . . . [Wassmer] said the car
was sagging. I don't know about that. Gary Sebring
testified that . . . when he saw it parked, he did not
notice any problem with the suspension[.] . . .
[Wassmer], in talking to the dispatch operator, . . .
described the person as simply a black man driving an
old yellow car, didn't make any mention that he
thought there was an equipment violation at stake. He
never wrote a citation for an equipment violation.
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• . . [Wassmer is] supposed to balance the safety of
the public against the seriousness of the offense in
order to decide whether to even engage in a high speed
chase. . . . [W]ould an officer investigating a Class
C misdemeanor [the sagging] . . . chase a car down
1-15 . . . for like more than 3 0 blocks, over 70 miles
an hour, down an off ramp, back onto the freeway -doesn't that sound a little incredible to you? . . .
The officer testified that this man confessed to him
having committed a felony and he did not record it.
. . . Why didn't he bring us that proof? . . . The
evidence showed that the video equipment was available
to this officer and he declined to use it. . . . I
don't know how reliable his own word can be when you
look at some of the suspicious areas in his testimony
like the sagging car, like his being in the left-hand
lane of the freeway when he was also over in the 72nd
South exit.
(R 350-54) .
The improper exclusion of the evidence impeaching Trooper
Wassmer's credibility was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
"The cross-examination of a witness, testifying against the accused,
provides a means of attacking his credibility and thus the substance
of his testimony."

Chesnut, 621 P.2d at 1233 (emphasis added);

accord State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650 (Utah 1985) (quoting Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) ("Cross-examination

is the

principal means by which the believability of a witness and the
truth of his testimony are tested")). State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610
(Utah 1986) ("It is elementary that the fact finder may accept all,
part, or none of a witness's testimony").

At the very least, lesser

included offenses 10 may have been an acceptable alternative to a jury

10. The lesser included misdemeanor offenses were
"interference with a peace officer making a lawful arrest" and
- [footnote continued on next page]-
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who, had they been fully and properly informed, would have had
reason to question aspects of Trooper Wassmer's testimony.

State v.

Brown, 694 P.2d 587, 590 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) ("questions of
credibility and choices between differing versions of the facts
belong properly to the jury").

Mr. Leyva's conviction should be

reversed.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Leyva respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and remand for a new trial with an order suppressing the
improperly elicited statements.

10

- [footnote continued]-

"disobeying a peace officer or traffic controller." (R 139, 140).
"Interference with a peace officer making a lawful arrest" requires,
inter alia, proof that Mr. Leyva knew or should have known "that a
peace officer was seeking to effect a lawful arrest of detention of
Mr. Leyva" and that there was interference with said arrest or
detention by "refusal to perform any act required by lawful order
necessary to effect the arrest or detention[.]" (R 139); Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-305. "Disobeying a peace officer or traffic controller"
requires, inter alia, proof that Mr. Leyva willfully failed or
refused to comply with any lawful order or direction of any peace
officer." (R 140); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13. The greater offense,
"Failure to respond to officer's signal to stop", requires, inter
alia, proof "[t]hat after having received a visual or audible signal
from a police officer to bring his vehicle to a stop he either . . .
operated his vehicle in a willful or wanton disregard of such signal
so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or
person . . . [or] knowingly or intentionally attempted to flee or
elude a peace officer by vehicle or other means." (R 133); Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-13.
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SUBMITTED this

/O

day of April, 1994.

5RONALD S. ^FUJtENO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

ELIZABETH HUNT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that I have caused eight
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102,
and two copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
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DELIVERED by
this

day of April, 1994
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day of April, 1994.

ADDENDUM A

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger, nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

vant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

MOTOR VEHICLE ACT

41-la-1303

41-la-1302. Violations class C misdemeanor.
A violation of any provision of this chapter is a class C misdemeanor, unless
otherwise provided.

41-la-1305. License plate and registration card violations
— Class C misdemeanor.
It is a class C misdemeanor
(1) to break, injure, interfere with, or remove from any vehicle any
seal, lock, or device on it for holding or displaying any license plate or
registration card attached for denoting registration and identity of the
vehicle;
(2) to removefromany registered vehicle the license plate or registration card issued or attached to it for its registration;
(3) to place or display any license plate or registration card upon any
other vehicle than the one for which it was issued by the division;
(4) to use or permit the use or display of any license plate, registration
card, or permit upon or in the operation of any vehicle other than that for
which it was issued;
(5) to operate upon any highway of this state any vehicle required by
law to be registered without having the license plate or plates securely
attached, and the registration card issued by the division carried in the
vehicle, except that the registration card issued by the division to all
trailers and semitrailers shall be carried in the towing vehicle;
(6) for any weighmaster to knowingly make any false entry in his
record of weights of vehicles subject to registration or to knowingly report
to the commission or division any false information regarding the
weights;
(7) for any inspector, officer, agent, employee, or other person performing any of the functions required for the registration or operation of vehicles subject to registration, to do, permit, cause, connive at, or permit to
be done any act with the intent, or knowledge that the probable effect of
the act would be to injure any person, deprive him of his property, or to
injure or defraud the state with respect to its revenues relating to title or
registration of vehicles;
(8) for any person to combine or conspire with another to do, attempt to
do, or cause or allow any of the acts in this chapter classified as a misdemeanor;
(9) to operate any motor vehicle with a camper mounted on it upon any
highway without displaying a current decal in clear sight upon the rear of
the camper, issued by the county assessor of the county in which the
camper has situs for taxation;
(10) to manufacture, use, display, or sell any facsimile or reproduction
of any license plate issued by the division or any article that would appear to be a substitute for a license plate; or
(11) to fail to return to the division any registration card, license plate
or plates, decal, permit, or title that has been canceled, suspended, voided.

41-6-13.5.
Fleeing — Causing property damage or bodily
injury — Suspension of driver's license — Forfeiture of vehicle — Penalties.
(1) An operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from a
peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful or
wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by
vehicle or other means is guilty of a felony of the third degree. The court shall,
as part of any sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of not less than
$1,000.
(2) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and while so doing causes death
or serious bodily injury to another person, under circumstances not amounting to murder or aggravated murder, is guilty of a felony of the second degree.
The court shall, as part of any sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of
not less than $5,000.
(3) (a) In addition to the penalty provided under this section or any other
section, an operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from
a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful
or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the
operation of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a
peace officer by vehicle or other means, shall have his driver's license
revoked pursuant to Subsection 41-2-127(l)(h) [53-3-220(l)(h)] for a period of one year.
(b) The court shall collect the driver's license to be revoked and forward
it to the Division of Drivers' License Services, along with a report of the
conviction. If the court is unable to collect the driver's license, the court
shall nevertheless forward the report to the division. If the person is the
holder of a driver's license from another jurisdiction, the court shall not
collect the driver's license but shall notify the division and the division
shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing state.

41-6-13. Obedience to peace officer or other traffic controllers.
(1) A person may not willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order
or direction of any peace officer, fireman, flagger at a highway construction or
maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing guard invested by law
with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic.
(2) When flaggers at highway construction or maintenance sites are directing traffic they shall use devices and procedures conforming to the latest
edition of the "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and
Highways."

76-8-305* Interference with arresting officer.
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and
interferes with the arrest or detention by:
(1) use offeree or any weapon;
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful
order:
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention.

ADDENDUM B

ELIZABETH HUNT #5292
Attorney for Mr. Leyva
424 East 500 South Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Motion To Suppress
: Mr. Leyva*s Statements

Plaintiff,
v.
ROGELIO LIMONTA LEYVA,

:

Case No. 941901168FS

:

Hon. J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant.

Comes now Rogelio Limonta Leyva, by and through
counsel, Elizabeth Hunt, and hereby moves this Court to suppress
all statements made by him to the police.
Prior to the admission of any statements made during
accusatory or custodial interrogation, it is the government's
burden to show that Mr. Leyva was informed of and waived his
Miranda rights.

Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah

1983); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

The government

must alsp demonstrate that the statements were constitutionally
voluntary.

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988).

Once a
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suspect invokes the right to remain silent, officers must cease
questioning the suspect.

If there is an equivocal invocation of

the right to remain silent, police are limited to clarifying the
issue.

Statements taken in violation of these rules are to be

suppressed.

State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894 (Utah App. 1993).

Statements made after an illegal arrest must be excluded unless
the government can demonstrate that the statements were untainted
by and causally disconnected from the illegal arrest.

Taylor v.

Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982).
Mr. Leyva hereby invokes his rights pursuant to the
foregoing case law; Article I sections 7, 12 and 14 of the Utah
Constitution; and the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution.

Mr. Leyva formally notifies the

government that it must meet the aforementioned burdens at the
evidentiary hearing to be held prior to trial.
Respectfully submitted this

/ y£~day of Y/L/

, 1994.

E yL EfABETH \tUJNT

Attorney £©r Mr. Leyva
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered/mailed a copy of this
motion to the Deputy County Attorney this

1994.

day of

J£^
^uswcwrr

X
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ADDENDUM C

Third Judicial District
DAVID E.YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attomey
ROBERT L. STOTT, Bar No. 3131
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

OCT 1 1 1994

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SUPRESS

)

Case No. 941901168FS

'

Hon. J. Dennis Frederick

-vsROGELIO LEYVA LIMONTA,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on September 26,1994, to hear
argument on the defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant was represented by his attorney,
Elizabeth Hunt, and the State was represented by Robert L. Stott. The Court having heard
argument and evidence presented by the parties, hereby makes the following findings
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On July 24,1994, at approximately 9:00 PM, Utah Highway Trooper Jon Wassmer
was on duty and traveling in his marked Highway Patrol vehicle on 1-15 near 4500 South in Salt
Lake County.
2. Trooper Wassmer noticed a vehicle traveling the same direction which appeared to sag
badly on one side.
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 941901168FS
Page two

3. Trooper Wassmer asked Dispatch to run the license plate number to determine its
registration. He learned that the plate was registered to an 1984 Buick.
4. The vehicle was, however, as Trooper Wassman could see, an Oldsmobile.
5. Trooper Wassmer pulled in behind the vehicle and activated his overhead lights.
6. Rather than stopping the vehicle immediately, increased its speed from 55 mph to 75
mph and sped down the freeway.
7. Trooper Wassmer activiated his siren and pursued the vehicle which eventually left
the freeway at 90th South and crashed as it attempted to make a turn.
8. The defendant was, and had been driving the car,
9. Trooper Wassmer arrested the defendant and a few moments later, in Trooper
Wassmer's car, advised the defendant of his Miranda rights by reading them from a standard DUI
form.
10. Trooper Wassmer asked the defendant if he understood his Miranda rights. The
defendant replied "Yes."
11. Trooper Wassmer asked the defendant if he would answer questions. The defendant
stated "I don't know." Trooper Wassmer said "You don't have to answer questions if you don't
want to. It's up to you." The defendant nodded his head in an affirmative manner.
12.

Trooper Wassmer then asked, "So why did you run?" The defendant immediately

answered, "The plates are on the wrong car."
13. Trooper Wassmer did not record this conversation.
WHEREFORE, having entered its Findings of Facts, the Court now makes the following
conclusions

OQOfi/i

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 941901168FS
Page three

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The stop and arrest of the defendant by Trooper Wassmer was based upon his
observing traffic violations occurring in his presense: license plate violation, speeding, and
failure to respond to an officer's signal.
2. The defendant's arrest and stop did not violate either Utah or United States
constitutional provisions.
3. Proper Miranda warnings were administered to the defendant by Trooper Wassmer.
4. The defendant understood his Miranda rights.
5. The defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights
before questioning fasued.
6. The questions and answers given post-Miranda are admissible in the trial.
7.

Trooper Wassmer's in the field unrecorded questioning of the defendant did not

violate any of the defendant's constitutional rights.
DATED this

llfVday of October, 1994.
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